INTRODUCTION
Where it began, I can't begin to knowin' But then I know it's growing strong. . . . Sweet Caroline, Good times never seemed so good. . . .
-Neil Diamond

1
To courts pining for a common law rule lost in federal practice since before Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence, "[g]ood times never seemed so good" as when they could freely apply the Rule in Queen Caroline's Case. Rule 613(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, however, intentionally superseded that common law rule. 2 For more than thirty years, the solution of a minority of such nostalgic courts has been to apply the common law rule despite the plain meaning of Rule 613(b). 3 The refusal of these courts to recognize that the Rule in Queen Caroline's Case is no longer sound federal law has led the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules to reconsider if the drafters should have just codified the common law rule in the first place. 4 However, for the many reasons explained below, that would be a mistake.
Since 1975, Rule 613(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence has governed the admission of extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement in federal court. 5 The easiest way to define extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement is to start with a description of what it is not. When a cross-examiner questions a declarant witness directly about the witness's own prior statement, extrinsic evidence is not involved. 6 For example, a cross-examiner asks a witness, "Didn't you tell the responding officer that your assailant was between 5'8" and 6'0"?" Such questions are permitted as direct evidence of a prior inconsistent statement without limitation under 1.
NEIL DIAMOND, Sweet Caroline, on SWEET CAROLINE (UNI Records 1969).
2.
See infra Part II.
3.
See infra note 157.
4.
See ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES OF EVIDENCE, AGENDA BOOK 238-39 (April 3, 2012), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/ Evidence/EV2012-04.pdf.
FED. R. EVID. 613(b). 6.
See ROGER PARK & TOM LININGER, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: IM-PEACHMENT AND REHABILITATION § 5.6 (2012).
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Rule 613(a). 7 When the cross-examiner moves beyond questioning the declarant witness about the prior statement to proving the statement with documentary evidence or calling another witness to recount the declarant witness's prior statement, extrinsic evidence exists and triggers Rule 613(b). 8 For example, the testimony of the responding officer that the witness had in fact told him that the assailant was between 5'8" and 6'0" is extrinsic evidence of the prior statement.
Rule 613(b) requires the proponent of the prior inconsistent statement to provide the declarant an opportunity to explain or deny it. 9 There is no requirement that the proponent provide that opportunity at any particular time or in any particular sequence. 10 The Rule further requires that opposing counsel receive a similar opportunity to examine the declarant witness about the statement. 11 At the time the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules drafted the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 613 reflected a change from the common law that had fallen out of fashion in the federal courts. 12 That common law rule, known as the Rule in Queen Caroline's Case or the Rule in Queen's Case, 13 required the proponent of a prior inconsistent statement to confront the declarant witness with the statement on cross-examination before introducing any extrinsic evidence of the prior statement. 14 For a variety of reasons, the Advisory Committee reasoned that the Rule in Queen Caroline's Case constituted an unnecessary encumbrance on crossexamination. 15 Despite the plain meaning of Rule 613(b) and the clear explanation in the Advisory Committee's Note, 16 a number of federal courts have continued to apply the common law Rule in Queen Caroline's Case, citing assorted rationales for doing so. 17 The actions of these courts have caught the attention of the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules. 18 That Committee has entertained the idea of 19 This Article considers the law governing the admission of extrinsic evidence and evaluates the need for amending Rule 613(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Part I explains the history behind the Rule in Queen Caroline's Case from its pronouncement in English Parliament in 1820, through its adoption in the United States, to its modern application, and finally, to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975. 20 Part II examines the application of Rule 613. 21 In Part III, the Article explains the split among United States courts of appeals, in which most circuit courts apply Rule 613(b) as intended, 22 and a minority of circuit courts apply the superseded Rule in Queen Caroline's Case. 23 Part IV suggests that, rather than amend Rule 613(b) to return to the common law Rule in Queen Caroline's Case, the Advisory Committee should take no action concerning the Rule. If the Advisory Committee feels compelled to take action to make uniform the application of the Rule, it should amend the Rule to promote its enforcement as originally intended. 24 
I. OLD SCHOOL: THE RULE IN QUEEN CAROLINE'S CASE
The Rule in Queen Caroline's Case arose in the House of Lords in 1820 as a procedure devised in the monumental Parliamentary pseudo-criminal divorce proceedings by which Queen Caroline's husband, King George IV, attempted to divest her of her title and her rights. 25 Historians Leonard Stern and Daniel Grosh described the proceedings as "involv[ing] nothing more than the foolish and scandalous personal lives of the most ridiculous royal couple in British history." 26 The parliamentary mechanism used to divest the Queen "was not even strictly a trial in the legal sense but rather a dusty and archaic legal relic dating from the time of Henry VIII. 
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The divorce was quite a scandal at the time, as both parties, cousins no less, 28 apparently maintained many extramarital sexual affairs. 29 The King could not obtain a straightforward divorce from the Queen under English law because, as Queen, she was not subject to the jurisdiction of ordinary courts of law. 30 Moreover, she could easily defeat any action for divorce that he might have brought in the ecclesiastical courts by filing a countercharge of adultery. 31 Instead, the King took a more creative route to rid himself of the Queen, using a tremendous amount of political capital to introduce a "bill of pains and penalties" in Parliament that could be passed by majority vote after three readings. 32 The bill, if passed, would strip the Queen of her title and divorce her from the King; she could also be sentenced to death for high treason. 33 A nontraditional trial in Parliament accompanied the proceedings and followed the rules of evidence and procedure of the ordinary law courts. 34 Prominently at issue during the trial was the character of the Queen herself. 35 During the trial, the Queen's former chambermaid, Louisa Demonte, testified on behalf of the prosecution about the Queen's romantic adventures throughout Europe. 36 On crossexamination, one of Queen Caroline's barristers, John Williams, questioned Demonte about two earlier letters she had written describing the Queen's good character: one to her own sister in which Demonte recounted the Queen's good character and alluded to being bribed to testify against the Queen and another letter to the Queen herself, requesting that the Queen hire her back into service. 37 38 Two hours into Williams's cross-examination of Demonte concerning her prior inconsistent statements, the prosecutor objected to the impeachment on the grounds that the best evidence of the contents of the letters was the letters themselves, which Williams had not yet introduced. 39 While the court considered the propriety of Williams's cross-examination of Demonte, the Queen's barristers did not argue that to show the witness the extrinsic evidence before confronting her with the letters would disable Williams's ability to effectively discredit her. 40 Her Majesty's barristers did not raise this argument because Williams had already effectively discredited Demonte for the two hours leading up to the court's ruling that Demonte was entitled to see the letters. 41 As a result, the court did not consider this argument before issuing its now infamous ruling. 42 The justices deliberated for only ten minutes and, relying on no precedential authority, announced what would later be called the Rule in Queen Caroline's Case, requiring a cross-examiner to show or read aloud extrinsic evidence of a witness's prior inconsistent statement before questioning the witness about the inconsistency. 43 After the court's ruling, Williams showed Demonte the letters and continued his cross-examination. 44 At the conclusion of the trial and upon the third reading in the House of Lords, the bill passed by only a majority of nine. 45 Concerned that his political gamble had run out of steam, the King abandoned the bill before sending it to the House of Commons. 46 The Queen maintained both her title and her marriage until her death. 47 Shortly after the Rule in 38. See Broadhead, supra note 37, at 252; Stern & Grosh, supra note 13, at 190. 39. See Stern & Grosh, supra note 13, at 191-93. It is true that the best evidence of the letters' contents were the letters themselves. In this case, however, this Best Evidence objection was inapplicable because the contents of the prior statements were not offered to prove the truth of their substance but to impeach the witness's credibility. Applying the Best Evidence Rule in such a case would prevent an attorney from challenging a witness's memory concerning the letters without first refreshing that memory by disclosing the contents of the letters. 49 Courts in both Massachusetts and Maine rejected the Rule because it was contrary to U.S. practice-as it had been contrary to English practice before the Queen's trial-and because concerns of fairness could be addressed without putting the witness on notice of the prior inconsistent statement. 50 As it was first adopted in the United States in 1832, the Rule in Queen Caroline's Case required the proponent of extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement to read or show the statement to the witness before cross-examining him about the inconsistency. 51 Over the next ten years, many more states followed suit, 52 and once it was widely disseminated in a leading legal treatise published in 1842, it gained universal acceptance in U.S. courts. 53 Unfortunately, the rule explained in that treatise was much more complex than the simple ruling of the court in Queen Caroline's trial. 54 Instead of describing that simple rule, Simon Greenleaf, the author of the preeminent evidentiary treatise of the time, incorporated several of the court's rulings from that trial into one rule, which combined became known in U.S. common law as the Rule in Queen Caroline's Case. 55 In addition to requiring the cross-examiner to read or show to the witness extrinsic evidence of a prior 48 inconsistent statement before questioning her about the inconsistency, the rule Greenleaf laid out also required the proponent to lay a specific foundation before the introduction of that statement. 56 As Greenleaf's formulation spread, the U.S. common law surrounding the Rule in Queen Caroline's Case also grew to require the cross-examiner to describe the substance of the statement, to identify the time and place of the statement, and to list the people present when the statement was made. 57 This particular aspect of the Rule in Queen Caroline's Case is often referred to as the "prior foundation" requirement. The reasons for adopting the rule in the United States were numerous. They included: (1) preventing unfair surprise and embarrassment to the declarant witness by allowing her the opportunity to deny having made the prior statement; 58 (2) requiring production of the original statement; 59 (3) promoting efficiency by allowing the declarant witness to admit to the inconsistency, thus obviating the need for the introduction of the prior inconsistent statement (rendering it cumulative under Rule 403); 60 and (4) highlighting, through juxtaposition, that a prior inconsistent statement is generally admissible for impeachment only and not as substantive evidence. 61 The downside of such a foundation is that it requires an attorney to show his hand to both opposing counsel and the witness:
[I]f the rule in the Queen's Case is followed, and it is required that the witness first be shown or read the letter, this valuable Typically, a court admitting extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement will provide a limiting instruction to the jury explaining that the evidence is being admitted to reflect on the credibility of the witness and that the jury should not consider it as proof that the content of the statement is true.
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Caroline 291 chance to test his memory and veracity is lost. A forgetful witness will have his memory of the letter refreshed or corrected, though his memory for the rest of his testimony remains faulty. A lying witness will discover the matters on which he may safely lie and those on which he must equivocate, thus guarding the lie from discovery. 62 The Rule in Queen Caroline's Case, then, allows the witness the opportunity to conform her testimony to the prior statement in order to obfuscate the inconsistency. 63 As the English had since rejected the Rule in 1854, 64 several U.S. jurists and legal scholars agreed that U.S. courts should similarly abandon the Rule in Queen Caroline's Case because they decried it as an unnecessary impediment to effective cross-examination. 65 Professor John Henry Wigmore stated in his treatise in 1904 that, "In the year 1820 an English decision laid down a rule which for unsoundness of principle, impropriety of policy, and practical inconvenience in trials committed the most notable mistake that can be found among the rulings upon the present subject." 66 Another scholar noted, "For Wigmore, cross-examination was the great legal weapon for truth, and the Rule in the Queen's Case was an insuperable barrier to the most telling use of crossexamination." 67 Nonetheless, the Rule in Queen Caroline's Case had already taken root in U.S. common law. 68 To evaluate the propriety of amending Rule 613 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to incorporate the Rule in Queen Caroline's Case, as that Rule was applied at U.S. common law, it is necessary to identify the differences between Rule 613 and the Rule in Queen Caroline's Case. The Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules first proposed the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1969, and Congress finally adopted them in 1975. 71 By that time, the Rule in Queen Caroline's Case had fallen out of favor in federal practice. 72 To that end, the Advisory Committee intentionally omitted the common law rule from Rule 613. 73 Rule 613 is broken down into two parts, as follows: 
A. Rule 613(a)
Rule 613(a) did away with the Rule in Queen Caroline's Case as it relates to questioning a witness about his or her own statement.
75
Under Rule 613(a), a cross-examiner may question a witness directly about his or her own prior inconsistent statement without ever disclosing the content of the prior inconsistent statement. 76 Out of fairness, however, the cross-examiner must disclose the contents of the prior inconsistent statement to opposing counsel upon request. 77 Take, for example, a simple car accident in which the driving conditions are a central issue in the case. Paula Plaintiff alleges that Darrell Defendant rear-ended her Pontiac at a stop sign with his Dodge Dart. On direct examination, Paula Plaintiff testified that there was full sun on the well-lit intersection at the time of the accident and that the road was dry. Pursuant to Rule 613(a), defense counsel could cross-examine Paula as follows: 
B. Rule 613(b)
As adopted in 1975 and in its current restyled form, Rule 613(b) officially removed the requirement of a prior foundation for the admission of extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement. Most notably, Rule 613(b) eliminated the requirement that the witness be given an opportunity to explain or deny the inconsistency before a court admits extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement. 78 Additionally, a cross-examiner is no longer required to describe the substance of the prior inconsistent statement to the declarant witness, the time and place the statement was made, or the individuals present at the time the statement was made before introducing extrinsic evidence of the statement. 79 Instead, all that is required is that the impeaching attorney give the declarant witness an opportunity to explain or deny the statement and that opposing counsel receive the opportunity to examine the witness on this subject. 80 Notably, the majority of federal circuit courts do not require the cross-examiner to call the declarant witness and pose the questions prompting the explanation or denial of the prior inconsistent statement; the Rule is satisfied as long as opposing counsel has the opportunity to do so. 81 The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 613(b) is quite clear that the timing for laying the foundation is irrelevant; extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement is admissible whether the proponent lays the foundation before or after introducing the inconsistent statement. 82 The Note specifies: "The traditional insistence that the attention of the witness be directed to the statement on cross-examination is relaxed in favor of simply providing the witness an opportunity to explain and the opposite party an opportunity to examine on the statement, with no specification of any particular time or sequence." 83 Therefore, Rule 613(b) explicitly eliminated the prior foundation requirement of the Rule in Queen Caroline's Case. 84 Additionally, the Advisory Committee's Note contemplates that courts will use their discretion to admit, rather than exclude, extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement where the foundational requirements of Rule 613 cannot be satisfied. 85 That Note states, "In order to allow for such eventualities as the witness becoming unavailable by the time the statement is discovered, a measure of discretion is conferred upon the judge." 86 That the discretion the Advisory Committee referenced is the discretion to admit, rather than to exclude, such evidence is apparent from its cross-reference to California Evidence Code § 770. 87 The Advisory Committee's Note to California Evidence Code § 770 states, "Where the interests of justice require it, the court may permit extrinsic evidence of an inconsistent statement to be admitted even though the witness has been excused and has had no opportunity to explain or deny the statement." 88 The Rule contemplates no discretion to exclude extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement, such as might justify exclusion of such evidence introduced before the proponent allows the witness to explain or deny the inconsistency, but after the court has excused the otherwise available witness. 89 Because Rule 613(b) eliminated the requirement that such a foundation be laid prior to the admission of extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement, as had been required under the common law Rule in Queen Caroline's Case, the impeaching attorney has two options for impeaching a witness under 613(b). 90 A: She told me that the sky was dark at the time of the accident and it had just begun to sleet. Rule 613(b), however, offers an alternative to this first method, which leaves the Rule in Queen Caroline's Case by the wayside. This second option allows the cross-examiner to highlight in-court testimony to set it up for juxtaposition with the prior inconsistent statement without ever mentioning the prior statement. 92 Then, the cross-examiner can introduce the extrinsic evidence. 93 Finally, opposing counsel can recall the declarant witness to provide the opportunity to deny the statement. 94 Using the example of Paula Plaintiff's cross-examination once again, the second option would unfold as follows: This method is wholly appropriate under Rule 613(b), but it would violate the common law Rule in Queen Caroline's Case because defense counsel did not give Paula Plaintiff the opportunity to explain or deny the prior inconsistent statement before introducing extrinsic proof of that prior statement. Defense counsel did not put Paula on notice that he had any such extrinsic evidence, leaving her with just enough rope to hang herself during her initial cross-examination. She learned of the existence of extrinsic evidence of her prior inconsistent statement at the same time that the jury did, making it more difficult for her to deny the inconsistency.
C. The Role of the Advisory Committee
The Advisory Committee chose not to codify the Rule in Queen Caroline's Case in Rule 613 for several reasons. First, the time saved by allowing the declarant witness to admit or deny the statement before confronting her with extrinsic evidence of the prior inconsistent statement was minimal, significantly undercutting the oftcited reason justifying the Rule in Queen Caroline's Case. 95 Second, a requirement that an impeaching attorney disclose the contents of a prior inconsistent statement to opposing counsel satisfies the concern for preventing unfair surprise to opposing counsel. 96 Third, a requirement that the proponent of the evidence provide the witness an opportunity to explain or deny an inconsistent statement, either before or after the admission of extrinsic evidence of the witness's prior inconsistent statement, addresses the concern for fairness to the declarant witness. These reasons are compounded by the questionable policy behind the initial adoption of the Rule in Queen Caroline's Case and the swiftness with which England dispensed with its newly created rule, as discussed in Part I of this Article.
98 Additionally, at the time it was first adopted, the Rule in Queen Caroline's Case represented a departure from U.S. common law; it was initially rejected by several jurisdictions 99 before being adopted by New York 100 and eventually other state and federal courts. Moreover, the Rule in Queen Caroline's Case was no longer even followed in federal practice by 1969 when the Federal Rules of Evidence were drafted. 101 Finally, the common law rule denied the jury the significant benefit of assessing the declarant's credibility without forewarning the declarant witness that she may be backing herself into a corner. 102 John Henry Wigmore himself vehemently criticized the Rule in Queen Caroline's Case for impeding the abilities of a cross-examiner. Wigmore extolled, as scholar Tom Lininger put it, the art of cross-examination as "our greatest invention for truth-seeking." 103 Professor Lininger noted that "Cross-examination is the purest expression of our adversarial process. It is the highlight of the trial for both jurors and lawyers. It is the moment in litigation when the best lawyers distinguish themselves." 104 The recent Supreme Court decision in Crawford v. Washington 105 affirmed the importance of cross-examination. In that case, the Court explained that "the vital importance of the rule securing the right of cross-examination" has been "burned into the general consciousness." 106 
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[VOL. 47:2 ascertaining truth, but they cannot supplant cross-examination. Indeed, in a criminal trial, a defendant's right to crossexamination is no less sacred than his right to a jury trial. 107 In drafting Rule 613(b), the Advisory Committee had determined that the costs of impeding cross-examination outweighed the benefits of the Rule in Queen Caroline's Case.
III. A CIRCUIT SPLIT: COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS OF RULE 613(b)
It is clear that the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules intended Rule 613(b) to eliminate any prior foundation requirement that existed at common law attributable to the Rule in Queen Caroline's Case. 108 Moreover, the Advisory Committee intended that, if courts would exercise any discretion in applying Rule 613(b), that discretion would favor the admission, rather than exclusion, of extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statements. 109 Nonetheless, a number of U.S. courts of appeals have affirmed decisions of federal district courts excluding extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement where the impeaching party failed to lay a prior foundation. 110 
A. The Majority View: Rule 613(b) Does not Require a Prior Foundation
The majority of U.S. courts of appeals apply Rule 613(b) pursuant to its plain meaning and to the meaning prescribed by the Advisory Committee's Note-namely, without imposing a prior foundation requirement. 113 However, these appellate courts often note that they do not condone the practice of "sandbagging" 114 to introduce extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement. 115 The following U.S. courts of appeals require a prior foundation even where the declarant is available for recall by either party: 113. E.g., Della Rose, 403 F.3d at 903 (determining extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement should have been admitted although impeaching party failed to confront witness with inconsistency on cross-examination); United States v. Moore, 149 F.3d 773, 781-82 (8th Cir. 1998) (affirming trial court's admission of prior inconsistent statement after witness's cross-examination where court allowed recall of the witness in surrebuttal as "consistent with the plain language of Rule 613(b)"); Young, 86 F.3d at 949 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming admission of extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement where witness was not confronted on cross-examination but witness was available for recall); McCall, 85 F.3d at 1197 (finding extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement admissible even after cross-examination where witness is available for recall); Hudson, 970 F.2d at 956 (finding that court should have admitted extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement although impeaching party did not confront witness with inconsistency during cross-examination); Theriot, 783 F.2d at 533 (permitting introduction of extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement before confronting witness with inconsistency later in same cross-examination); McGuire, 744 F.2d at 1204 (ruling extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement was admissible although it was not introduced until after declarant witness was excused because he was available for recall on rebuttal); Barrett, 539 F.2d at 254-56 (where there is no demonstration of witness's unavailability for recall, extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement is admissible even after cross-examination).
114. "Sandbagging" is the ill-received practice of cross-examining a witness with full knowledge of the witness's prior inconsistent statement, making no reference to such statement during the cross-examination, then raising the prior statement for the first time when the proponent of the statement may next call witnesses. See FISHMAN, 
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Despite this concern about sandbagging, these courts have complied with Rule 613(b). Where the witness remained available for recall, courts have admitted evidence of a witness's prior inconsistent statements that the proponent introduced after the court had excused the witness. 116 In fact, a witness's availability for recall has been central to courts' decisions to follow Rule 613(b) and not enforce the prior foundation requirement of the Rule in Queen Caroline's Case. 117 In one of the earliest federal appellate cases applying the newly adopted Rule 613(b), United States v. Barrett, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the trial court's decision to exclude extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement. 118 A jury had convicted Arthur Barrett for stealing and reselling a museum's collection of postage stamps. 119 A key witness at trial was Buzzy Adams, who testified on direct examination for the government concerning a conversation between Adams and Barrett in October 1974. 120 According to Adams's testimony, Barrett admitted to Adams that he had committed the crimes alleged. 121 During its cross-examination of Adams, the defense did not question Adams about an earlier statement that he made to Thomas Delaney in November 1974, which Jeanne Kelley overheard, to the effect that Barrett had nothing to do with the crime. 122 In its case-in-chief, the defense attempted to call Delaney and Kelley to provide extrinsic evidence of Adams's prior inconsistent statement. 123 The trial court, however, excluded the testimony of Delaney and Kelley upon objection by the government, ruling that the defense had failed to lay a prior foundation for the admission of extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement during its cross-examination of Adams. 124 The First Circuit found that the trial court erred in so ruling. 125 It recognized that the common law that developed from the Rule in 116. See, e.g., Della Rose, 403 F.3d at 903 ("But the rule itself says only that the witness must have the opportunity to explain or deny his prior statement; it does not say that he must be given that opportunity before extrinsic evidence of the statement is admitted. . . . has relaxed any absolute requirement that this practice be observed, only requiring instead that the witness be afforded at some time an opportunity to explain or deny, and for further interrogation." 127 The court further held that this requirement of providing the witness an opportunity to explain or deny the inconsistency was satisfied even if the witness was never actually confronted with the prior inconsistent statement, as long as the witness was available for recall, whether or not opposing counsel took advantage of the ability to recall the witness. 128 In support of its position, the court relied on the testimony of the Reporter of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States. 129 The Reporter explained the objectives of the prior foundation requirement of the Rule in Queen Caroline's Case as threefold:
(1) to save time, since the witness may admit having made the statement and thus make the extrinsic proof unnecessary; (2) to avoid unfair surprise to the opposite party by affording him an opportunity to draw a denial or explanation from the witness; and (3) to give the witness himself, in fairness, a chance to deny or to explain the apparent discrepancy. 130 The Reporter, however, noted that the first of these objectives was insignificant, stating, "[T]he time saved is not great; the laying of the foundation may inadvertently have been overlooked; the impeaching statement may not have been discovered until later; and 
[VOL. 47:2 premature disclosure may on occasion frustrate the effective impeachment of a collusive witness." 131 The First Circuit adopted the Reporter's reasoning that the last two objectives could be equally achieved under Rule 613(b) as under the common law, as long as the witness was given the opportunity to explain or deny the inconsistency at some point during the trial. 132 The First Circuit also considered that trial courts have discretion to admit an unavailable witness's impeaching statement if the "interests of justice . . . warrant dispensing entirely with the opportunity to explain or deny." 133 Ultimately, the First Circuit determined that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of Delaney and Kelley. 134 It relied on the fact that the government could have recalled Adams to explain or deny the alleged inconsistency after Delaney and Kelley offered extrinsic evidence of the prior inconsistent statement. 135 The court noted that "the [district] court dismissed the evidence out of hand and made no inquiry into Adams'[s] availability." 136 If Adams could have been recalled, the government could have given him the opportunity to explain or deny the inconsistency in satisfaction of Rule 613(b).
In United States v. McGuire, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found no error in the trial court's admission of extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement after the witness had been excused. 137 That case involved the criminal trial of Leo McGuire, the President and CEO of the First National Bank of Grayson, surrounding the fraudulent use of funds from the Kentucky Housing Corporation's Loans to Lenders Program intended to provide low interest mortgages to low income Kentuckians. 138 During the trial, the defense presented the testimony of W.H. Dysard concerning the defendant's good faith use of the funds in question. 139 Dysard testified on direct examination that he first learned of the grand jury investigation in October 1980, but that he had been aware of an ongoing investigation before that point. 140 The government did not confront Dysard with any prior inconsistent statement during cross-examination, and he was excused. 141 In its rebuttal case, the government called FBI Agent Goode to testify that, on November 19, 1980, Dysard told him that he had "just become aware of the 'situation'" and that he had no additional knowledge about any investigation. 142 The Sixth Circuit recognized that, under the common law, the government would have been required to confront Dysard with the prior inconsistent statement during cross-examination. 143 It further recognized that Rule 613(b) contains no such requirement of a prior foundation. 144 Since the defendants were offered the chance to call Dysard in surrebuttal, however, the court found that the opportunity to admit or deny the statement, as contemplated by Rule 613(b), had been satisfied. 145 The court noted that "[h]ad this point been of great importance, they would have made arrangements to return Dysard to the stand but they did not do so." 146 In United States v. Della Rose, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reached a similar result. 147 In that case, attorney Steven Della Rose was convicted on charges stemming from seeking to obtain a false identification card in the name of a client to enable Della Rose's employee, Dennis Ilenfeld, to cash a settlement check in the client's name on behalf of Della Rose. 148 During the trial, Richard Britz, a former client of Della Rose, testified for the government that Della Rose had arranged for him to obtain a false identification card after his driver's license was suspended. 149 On cross-examination, the defense did not question Britz about any prior inconsistent statements. 150 The Seventh Circuit reversed and noted that Rule 613(b) "says only that the witness must have the opportunity to explain or deny his prior statement; it does not say that he must be given that opportunity before extrinsic evidence of the statement is admitted." 152 The court continued, "[T]he fact that Britz had not been asked about his statement to DeFrancesco on cross-examination did not necessarily preclude the defense from eliciting testimony from DeFrancesco about the statement; the government could have brought Britz back to the stand in its rebuttal case and asked him about the statement at that time." 153 The reasoning in Barrett, McGuire, and Della Rose is common to those cases applying Rule 613(b) as written. 154 It is consistent with the plain meaning of the Rule, which imposes no time constraint or sequence in introducing prior inconsistent statements. 155 Moreover, this interpretation is consistent with the Advisory Committee's Note. 156 The majority of courts of appeals, thus, honor both the letter and intent of the Rule. . 160 In Schnapp, Christopher Schnapp appealed his arson conviction. 161 During the trial, the government presented the testimony of Jim Schuhmacher, an investigator with the local prosecutor's office, stating that the fire originated on the floor of the furnace room and was deliberately set. 162 Defense counsel did not question Schuhmacher about a prior inconsistent statement during his crossexamination. 163 On the direct examination of Schnapp, however, defense counsel attempted to question him about a conversation between Schuhmacher and Schnapp immediately after the fire. 164 DiNapoli, 557 F. The trial court excluded this line of questioning on the government's objection because the defense had failed to first confront Schuhmacher with his prior inconsistent statement on cross-examination. 165 The defense made an offer of proof that Schnapp would testify that he spoke with Schuhmacher immediately after the fire, and Schuhmacher opined at that time that the fire originated in the ceiling of the furnace room. 166 Schnapp appealed the court's ruling on the basis that Schuhmacher was available for recall to explain or deny the inconsistent statement. 167 Considering the text of Rule 613(b), as well as the accompanying Advisory Committee's Note, the Eighth Circuit explained that under Rule 613(b), a witness's prior inconsistent statement can be introduced for impeachment before the witness is cross-examined concerning the statement. 168 Furthermore, this impeachment evidence can be introduced "even if the witness is never afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the alleged statement." 169 The court, nonetheless, concluded without explanation that admitting extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement after the available witness has been excused is optional; a district court is not required to do so. Unfortunately, the Eighth Circuit in Sutton failed to interpret the text or Advisory Committee's Note of Rule 613(b) in determining that trial courts have discretion to impose the prior foundation requirements of the Rule in Queen Caroline's Case, despite the plain meaning of Rule 613(b). Sutton, 41 F.3d 1257. In that case, the defendant, Eugene Sutton, appealed from the trial court's exclusion of a witness presenting extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement attributed to the government's key witness, Mr. Smith. Id. at 1260. The trial court based its decision on the fact that defense counsel did not confront Mr. Smith with the inconsistency on cross-examination. Id. The Eighth Circuit recognized that Rule 613(b) had "relaxed" the requirement of a prior foundation but noted that this "relaxed" procedure "is not mandatory, but is optional at the trial judge's discretion." Id. The court continued, " [S] ince this circuit has never adopted the rule in Barrett, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in not applying it." Id. The problem with this reasoning, however, is that Rule 613(b) eliminated the requirement of a prior foundation, whether the Eighth Circuit had previously adopted it or not. Thus, the decision in Schnapp is undermined by the court's reliance on the weak reasoning of Sutton.
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In addition to cases like Schnapp, which cite to unidentified discretion to exclude extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement properly introduced under Rule 613(b), other federal courts of appeals have similarly upheld exclusion, but under Rule 611(a) and Rule 403. 171 Some courts have found the basis for excluding extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement grounded in a court's discretion under Rule 611(a) 172 to exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence to avoid wasting time and to protect the witness from harassment and undue embarrassment. 173 Other courts cite the discretion afforded by Rule 403's caveat that even relevant evidence may be excluded if, for example, the evidence will confuse the jury. 174 Still other courts have affirmed the exclusion of such evidence by steadfastly maintaining the prior foundation requirements of common law in direct contravention of Rule 613(b)'s plain language. 175 None of these rationales is sound. (1) make those procedures effective for determining the truth; (2) avoid wasting time; and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.
FED. R. EVID. 611(a).
173. E.g., Hudson, 970 F.2d at 956 n.2 (maintaining that Rule 613(b) does not require prior opportunity to explain or deny, but noting that Rule 611(a) does give trial courts discretion to require prior foundation "when such an approach seems fitting"); see also PARK & LININGER, supra note 6 (trial court has discretion under Rule 611(a), as well as Advisory Committee's Note, to exclude extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement where the prior foundation was not laid).
174. E.g., Marks, 816 F.2d at 1210-11 (affirming trial court's decision disallowing extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement to avoid jury confusion); Alvarez, 1991 WL 259008, at *2 (citing Marks, 816 F.2d at 1210-11, in requiring impeaching party to first show extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement to witness to prevent jury confusion); see also, e.g., FISHMAN, supra note 75; PARK & LININGER, supra note 6.
175. E.g., Dierling, 131 F.3d at 733 ("Rule 613(b) allows impeachment by prior inconsistent statement only when a witness is first provided an opportunity to explain the statement."); United States v. Bonnett, 877 F.2d 1450, 1462 (10th Cir. 1989) (finding that, under Rule 613(b), "before a prior inconsistent statement may be introduced, the party making the statement must be given the opportunity to explain or deny the same."); United
Courts that impose a prior foundation requirement without explanation appear to do so in obvious disregard for the plain meaning of the Rule and the drafters' intent. In United States v. Dierling, for example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision of the trial court refusing to allow extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement where the witness was not first given an opportunity to explain the inconsistency. 176 In that case, the defendant Mark Perkins was convicted of conspiracy to manufacture, distribute, and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine. 177 At issue was the admissibility of the report of a DEA agent to impeach Michelle Crawford, a government witness. 178 The report contained the agent's account of his interview with Ms. Crawford, wherein she stated that Mr. Perkins had killed Danny Craig and told her that he fed his body to some hogs. 179 Despite possessing this report during the cross-examination of Ms. Crawford, the Defendant never mentioned it. 180 When the Defendant attempted to introduce the report during the testimony of the DEA agent who created it, the trial court excluded the report. 181 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision of the trial court, providing no explanation other than the inaccurate statement that "Rule 613(b) allows impeachment by prior inconsistent statement only when a witness is first provided an opportunity to explain the statement." 182 This is in clear contravention of the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 613(b), which relaxes the requirement that the witness be provided the opportunity to explain the prior inconsistent statement before being impeached with it. 183 Claims that a court has discretion pursuant to Rule 611(a) to exclude extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement that otherwise conforms to Rule 613(b) are similarly weak. 184 truth of the matter asserted. 214 Because that objection was so untimely, the most worthy argument against the court's ruling -that to show the witness the extrinsic evidence before confronting her with it would disable the impeaching attorney's ability to effectively discredit her-was never made since it was, by that time, moot. 215 The court that created the Rule did so after only ten minutes of deliberation and relied on no precedent. 216 England recognized that the Rule in Queen Caroline's Case was erroneous shortly after the Rule became law, and it abandoned the Rule thirty-four years later. 217 Meanwhile, the policy reasons behind the Advisory Committee's thoughtfully drafted Rule 613(b) remain valid. The element of surprise in impeachment is still useful in a jury's assessment of the declarant witness's credibility and, thus, remains an important tool in the trial lawyer's toolbox. 218 Concern for fairness to opposing counsel is mitigated by Rule 613(a)'s requirement that the impeaching attorney provide a copy of an inconsistent statement to opposing counsel upon request. 219 Similarly, Rule 613(b) satisfies the concern for fairness to the witness by requiring that the witness be given an opportunity to explain or deny the inconsistency at some point. 220 Moreover, concern for a witness's embarrassment at being confronted with a prior inconsistent statement supported by evidence available to opposing counsel 221 misses the mark; one should be more concerned with the jury's ability to assess that witness's credibility. Finally, the amount of time saved by avoiding recalling the declarant witness is not so significant to outweigh the benefits of allowing the jury to witness the confrontation in whatever dramatic way counsel chooses. At the very least, there is no reason to believe that time-saving has decreased since the Advisory Committee drafted the Rule in 1969.
If the Advisory Committee feels strongly that some action must be taken, it should do so with the aim of promoting enforcement of, rather than drastically altering, the current rule. This could be accomplished by revising Rule 613(b) in two ways.
